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An impressive number of transnational committees populates the 
EU institutional system. Their statutes and internal regulations are 
almost all unpublished, their composition and agendas are largely 
unknown, their meetings inaccessible. Nevertheless, this almost 
impenetrable «jungle» is actually the life force animating EU decision-
making: all implementing measures are defined and approved by the 
comitology committees; agreement on the substance of most legislative 
measures is reached at the level of Council working groups; the 
Commission’s power of initiative is exercised by – or, at least, shared 
with – committees composed of national officials. Is this seemingly 
technocratic nightmare radically unconstitutional? The answer I put 
forward in this paper is negative. After a brief discussion of the ECJ’s 
formalistic approach to the comitology issue, I shall argue that: a) the 
committee system coheres with a functional (or vertical) understanding of 
the principle of institutional balance anchoring the European composite 
system; b) in such a multi-level system, the existing mechanisms for 
ensuring the accountability of administrative bodies cannot be 
understood by the classic hierarchical «transmission belt model»; c) 
notwithstanding recent improvements in the transparency and the 
rationality of certain kinds of committees, there are still parts of this 
jungle in which law’s legitimising potential remains hidden.  
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1.  EU Committees: «Iceberg Theory» and Technocratic Nightmare  
 
Three kinds of transnational committees play an important but 
obfuscating role in the EU decision-making process. Firstly, comitology 
or executive committees, composed of national officials: they assist the 
Commission in implementing Community law. Secondly, Council 
legislative committees and working groups, composed of national 
officials: they prepare the ministers’ legislative decisions. Thirdly, expert 
committees, composed of national officials and/or representatives of 
social and economic interests or independent experts: they carry out 
various tasks mainly in the initiative phase of lawmaking. The number of 
transnational administrative committees is impressive: according to recent 
estimates, there are more than two hundred and fifty comitology 
committees
1, almost two hundred Council committees
2 and more than 
1000 expert committees
3. There are thus approximately 1500 EU 
committees altogether
4. Their statutes and internal regulations are almost 
all unpublished, their composition and agendas are largely unknown and 
their meetings, inaccessible. Nevertheless, this almost impenetrable 
jungle is actually the life force animating EU decision-making: 
implementing measures are defined and approved by the comitology 
committees in over 99 percent of the cases; agreement on the substance of 
                                                 
1 Report from the Commission on the working of committees in 2002, 8 September 
2003, COM/2003/530 final, para. 2.1, tab. 1, documents that there were 257 active 
comitology committees in 2002.  
2 There were exactly 159 active Council committees – 247 if sub-committees are 
included – in February 2004 (Council of the European Union, List of Council 
preparatory bodies, Brussels, 23 February 2004, doc. no. 6124/04). 
3 Unofficial but reliable data are collected by the Secretary General of the 
Commission in the following internal documents: SEC (2002) 868/1, 22 July 2002, and 
SEC (2002) 868/2, 22 July 2002. According to data cited in T. Larsson, Pre-cooking in 
the European Union. The World of Expert Groups, Stockholm, ESO-report, 2003, p. 
152-154 (available at http://finans.regeringen.se/eso), there were a total of 851 expert 
committees in 2000, 482 of which were temporary; taking the various committees’ sub-
committees into account, the total number rises to 1352. 
4 See also D. Guéguen e C. Rosberg, Comitology and other EU committees and 
experts groups. The hidden power of the EU: finally a clear explanation, Brussels, 
Europe Information Service, 2004. Cahier européen n°03/2005  4 
 
legislative measures is reached in 70-75 percent of the cases at the level 
of Council working groups (thus, below the COREPER level); the 
Commission’s power of initiative is exercised by – or, at least, shared 
with – committees composed of national officials (sometimes interest 
committees and scientific committees are also consulted)
5.  
This simple quantitative overview illustrates the so-called iceberg 
theory, according to which, in EU decision-making, «only a small 
proportion of all dossiers seem to be dealt with by Commission officials 
and Council Ministers, while the bulk of these dossiers seems to be 
determined by committees»
6. Of course, the idea that unelected 
bureaucratic bodies make the bulk of EU decisions doesn’t fit very well 
into a classic understanding of «democracy». These committees are 
moreover largely unaccountable to the European Parliament.  
Is this seemingly technocratic nightmare radically unconstitutional? 
The answer I put forward in this paper is negative. After a brief 
discussion of the ECJ’s formalistic approach to the comitology issue, I 
shall argue that: a) the committee system coheres with a functional (or 
vertical) understanding of the principle of institutional balance anchoring 
the European composite system; b) in such a multi-level system, the 
existing mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of administrative 
bodies cannot be understood by the classic hierarchical «transmission belt 
model»
7; c) notwithstanding recent improvements in the transparency and 
                                                 
5 For an in-depth analysis of the organization, functioning and influence of these 
three groups of committees, see M. Savino, I comitati dell’Unione europea. La 
collegialità amministrativa negli ordinamenti compositi, Milano, Giuffrè, 2005, chapters 
2, 3 and 4. 
6 M.P.C.M. van Schendelen, EC Committees: Influence Counts more than Legal 
Power, in R.H. Pedler and G.F. Schaefer (eds.), Shaping European Law and Policy: The 
Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political Process, Maastricht, Eipa, 1996, p. 
37. See also, Market Access Europe, Brussels – the Tip of the Iceberg. The Role of 
Committees in the EC’s Decision-making System, Brussels, Market Access Europe, 
1993.  
7 For a critical discussion of this model, with regard to national administrations, see 
S. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, in Harvard Law Review, 
1975, vol. 88, p. 1669, Id., Madison’s Nightmare, in University of Chicago Legal Forum, 
1990, vol. 57, p. 335, and also S.P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 
Administrative Process, in Columbia Law Review, 1998, vol. 98, p. 1. Cahier européen n°03/2005  5 
 
the rationality of certain kinds of committees, there are still parts of this 
jungle in which law’s legitimising potential remains hidden.  
 
 
2.  The Inadequacy of the Court of Justice’s Formalistic Approach 
 
The Court of Justice has held that the committees do not exercise any 
decision-making power, and thus do not alter the institutional balance of 
the European Union. This view was put forward in the Köster
8 decision 
concerning executive committees, and more obliquely by the FAO
9 
decision regarding the Council legislative committees. Criticism of this 
formalistic approach has been widespread, and often penetrating
10. The 
voices from the academy, however, do not sing in unison.  
According to some scholars, the transnational administration created 
by the EU committees is illegitimate
11 or at least constitutionally 
«weak»
12. Others similarly question the legitimacy of the EU committees, 
                                                 
8 Case 25/70 Einfuhrstelle v. Köster [1971] ECR 1161. 
9 Case C-25/94 Commission v. Council (FAO) [1996] ECR I-1469. 
10 See J.H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: “Comitology” as Revolution – Infranationalism, 
Constitutionalism and Democracy, in C. Joerges and E. Vos (eds.), EU Committees: 
Social Regulation, Law and Politics, Oxford, Hart, 1999, p. 343-346, and, less directly, 
R. Dehousse, Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance, Jean 
Monnet Working Papers, n. 2/02, p. 16: «basic principles (such as the concept of 
“institutional balance”) have been instrumentalized […] The stubborn insistence on a non-
delegation doctrine has often been presented as a defence against a technocratic drift, and 
an attempt to preserve the “political” character of basic decisions against the evils of 
technocracy. However, the reality is somewhat more complex. The EU’s legislative processes 
are heavily technocratic. Moreover, despite many protests to the contrary, one has accepted 
– in fact, if not in law – that basic decisions are made by technocratic bodies of various 
kinds, the choices of which are duly rubber-stamped by “political” powers that be. EU law is 
then used as a façade to hide a reality that is deemed to be unacceptable. Law is said to 
protect normative values. Are these better served by this exercise in camouflage?». 
11 J.H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: “Comitology” as Revolution, op. cit.; C. Harlow, 
Accountability in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, 
especially p. 32 and 67. 
12 P. Lindseth, “Weak” Constitutionalism? Reflections on Comitology and 
Transnational Governance in the European Union, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
2001, vol. 21, n. 1, p. 145; Id., Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character 
of Supranationalism: The Example of the EEC, in Columbia Law Review, 1999, vol. 99, 
especially p. 626, and, more recently, Id., Delegation is Dead, Long Live Delegation: Cahier européen n°03/2005  6 
 
but acknowledge that similar problems also arise at the state level
13, and 
that they could be at least partially addressed by introducing such a 
procedure as the American «notice and comment»
14. Still others maintain 
that the transnational committees are an example of «deliberative 
supranationalism» and thus affirm their full constitutionality.
15 
In the constitutional debate however, there is agreement about the 
need to go beyond the Court’s approach, as it conceals the truly 
                                                                                                                        
Managing the Democratic Disconnect in the European Market-Polity, in C. Joerges and 
R. Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 139. 
13 P. Craig, The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy, 
in G. de Burca and P. Craig (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1999, p. 25; less assertively, G.F. Schäfer, Linking Member State and European 
Administrations – The Role of Committees and Comitology, in M. Adenas and A. Türk 
(eds.), Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC, The Hague, Kluwer, 
2000, p. 5. 
14 F. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call 
for Notice and Comment in Comitology, in Harvard International Law Journal, 1999, 
vol. 40, n. 2, p. 451; M. Everson, The Constitutionalisation of European Administrative 
Law: Legal Oversight of a Stateless Internal Market, in C. Joerges and E. Vos (eds.), EU 
Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, op. cit., p. 281. In the same vein, but 
more cautious, is R. Dehousse, Towards a Regulation of Transnational Governance? 
Citizen’s Right and the Reform of Comitology Procedures, in C. Joerges and E. Vos 
(eds.), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, op. cit., p. 109., especially 
p. 120, and P. Craig, Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An Empirical and 
Normative Assessment, in European Law Journal, 1997, vol. 3, p. 123.  
15 C. Joerges and J. Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative 
Political Processes: The Constitutionalization of Comitology, in European Law Journal, 
1997, vol. 3, n. 3, p. 273, and by the same authors, but from a political science 
perspective,  Transforming Strategic Interactions into Deliberative Problem-Solving: 
European Comitology in the Foodstuff Sector, in Journal of European Public Policy, 
1997, vol. 4, p. 609. Among the many articles in which these scholars have replied to 
criticism, it is worth mentioning: C. Joerges, “Deliberative Supranationalism” – Two 
Defences, in European Law Journal, 2002, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 133; J. Neyer, Discourse and 
Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Governance, and C. Joerges, 
“Comitology and the European Model?”. Towards a Rechts-Fertigungs-Recht in the 
Europeanisation Process, both in E.O. Eriksen, C. Joerges and J. Neyer (eds.), European 
Governance, Deliberation and The Quest For Democratisation, Oslo, Arena, 2003, p. 
235 and p. 501; J. Neyer, Explaining the unexpected: efficiency and effectiveness in 
European decision-making, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2004, vol. 11, n. 1, p. 
19. Cahier européen n°03/2005  7 
 




3.  The Principle of Institutional Balance 
 
The European Union is a mixed or composite legal system
16. Its 
institutional structure rests upon the principle of institutional balance, 
whereby EU institutions operate in conformity with the distribution of 
powers provided for by the treaties. The notion of institutional balance 
has been elaborated by the Court of Justice with reference to Article 7 of 
the EC Treaty, according to which «each institution shall act within the 
limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty». This is a 
controversial notion. Some authors consider it an «empty formula», 
which EU institutions stretch in different directions corresponding to their 
respective interests
17. Others refer to institutional balance as a legal 
principle
18, albeit of limited concrete relevance
19. Others still regard it as 
                                                 
16 S. Cassese, La costituzione europea: elogio della precarietà, and Id., Che tipo di 
potere pubblico è l’Unione europea?, both in Id., Lo spazio giuridico globale,  Roma, 
Laterza, 2003, respectively at p. 29 and p. 55; S. Cassese, L’Unione europea come 
organizzazione pubblica composita, in Id., La crisi dello Stato, Roma, Laterza, 2002, p. 
67. See also G. della Cananea, L’Unione europea. Un ordinamento composito, Roma, 
Laterza, 2003. 
17 R. Bieber, The Settlement of Institutional Conflicts on the Basis of Article 4 of the 
EEC Treaty, in Common Market Law Review, 1984, vol. 21, p. 519.  
18 G. Guillermin, Le principe de l’équilibre institutionnel dans la jurisprudence de 
la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes, in Journal du droit international, 
1992, p. 319; D. Simon, Le système juridique communautaire, Paris, Puf, 1997, p. 231; 
J. Gerkrath, L’émergence d’un droit constitutionnel pour l’Europe, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 
1997, p. 390; J.P. Jacqué, The Principle of Institutional Balance, in Common Market 
Law Review, 2004, vol. 41, p. 383. 
19 K. Lenaerts e A. Verhoeven, Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy 
in EU Governance, in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s 
Integrated Market, op. cit., p. 44; B. de Witte, The Role of Institutional Principles in the 
Judicial Development of the European Union Legal Order, in F. Snyder (ed.), The 
Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration, Oxford, Hart, 2000, 
p. 91-93; S. Prechal, Institutional Balance: A Fragile Principle with Uncertain Contents, 
in T. Heukels, N. Blokker e M. Brus (eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam: A 
legal Analysis, The Hague, Kluwer, 1998, p. 273. Cahier européen n°03/2005  8 
 
having normative value
20. In any case, a distinction must be made 
between the legal and political understanding of institutional balance: «il 
n’évoque en rien l’idée selon la quelle les auteurs des traités auraient mis 
en place une répartition équilibrée des pouvoirs entre les différentes 
institutions, mais plus simplement le fait que l’organisation 
communautaire est le reflet d’un équilibre des intérêts selon l’importance 
que les Etats ont assigné à chacun d’entre eux. Dans ce contexte, la tâche 
de la Cour est de faire respecter cette organisation des pouvoirs afin que 
ne puisse être remis en cause les arbitrages effectués au moment de la 
rédaction des traités»
21.  
In some cases, reference to the notion of institutional balance has 
enabled the Court of Justice to pronounce innovative doctrines. This is 
particularly evident in the Chernobyl case
22, in which – in contrast with 
previous interpretations expressed, among others, in the Isoglucose
23 and 
Wybot
24 cases – European judges have invoked this principle to affirm the 
capacity of the European Parliament to bring an action for annulment - a 
gap in the EC Treaty
25. Thus, by resorting to a dynamic (or functional) 
interpretation of the notion of institutional balance, the Court has affirmed 
a principle that complements the express provisions of the  treaties
26.  
 
                                                 
20 P. Craig, Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC, op. cit., p. 113; Id., The 
Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy, op. cit., p. 37-40.  
21 J.P. Jacqué, Cours général de droit communautaire,  Cours général de droit 
communautaire, in A. Clapham (ed.), Collected Courses of the Academy of European 
Law, vol. I, book 1, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1991, p. 292. 
22 Case C-70/88 European Parliament v. Council [1991] ECR I-4529.  
23 Case 138/79, Roquette Frère v. Council [1980] ECR 3333, para. 33.  
24 Case 149/85, Wybot v. Faure [1986]ECR 2391. 
25 Case C-70/88 European Parliament v. Council [1991] ECR I-4529, para. 26: 
«The absence in the Treaties of any provision giving the Parliament the right to bring an 
action for annulment may constitute a procedural gap, but it cannot prevail over the 
fundamental interest in the maintenance and observance of the institutional balance laid 
down in the Treaties establishing the European Communities».  
26 On the Court’s functional approach, S. Prechal, Institutional Balance: A Fragile 
Principle with Uncertain Contents, op. cit., p. 277, and J.P. Jacqué, The Principle of 
Institutional Balance, op. cit., p. 386: «In this case, the Court did not use the principle in 
a static manner, but on the contrary relied on it to supplement the Treaty in a dynamic 





4. The constitutionality of the EU committees 
 
In the following section, I shall analyse the constitutionality of 
transnational committees in light of the principle of institutional balance. 
My goal will be to demonstrate that the committees perform a decisive 
role in resolving two problems: the efficient allocation of powers among 
EU institutions and the effective administrative implementation of 
Community law. The arguments I put forward will have a substantive 





4.1. The  Horizontal  Dimension:  the Problem of Delegating Powers 
 
There are nearly seven thousand Commission officials who work to 
prepare legislative proposals and to implement Community policy
28. The 
Council’s decision-making work is carried out by the ministers of the 
Member States; but they are few and, being mainly engaged in domestic 
questions, can dedicate only limited time to Europe. Such meagre human 
resources are hardly sufficient for confronting the heavy workload of the 
two (out of the three) institutions having the most important role in the 
adoption and implementation of Community law. 
                                                 
27 For a similar attempt, E. Vos, The Rise of Committees, in European Law Journal, 
1997, vol. 3, n. 3, p. 223; Id., Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety 
Regulation. Committees, Agencies and Private Bodies, Oxford, Hart, 1999, especially 
pp. 83, 120. See also, Id., EU Committees: the Evolution of Unforeseen Institutional 
Actors in European Product Regulation, in C. Joerges and E. Vos (eds.), EU 
Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, op. cit., p. 19; W. Sauter and E. Vos, 
Harmonisation under Community Law: The comitology issue, in P. Craig and C. Harlow 
(eds.), Lawmaking in the European Union, London, Kluwer, 1998, p. 169. 
28 According to the data cited by N. Nugent, The European Commission, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, p. 169, there were 7068 A-grade bureaucrats in the 
Commission in 1999. Cahier européen n°03/2005  10 
 
This problem persists because of the Meroni doctrine, which prohibits 
the delegation of discretionary powers «to bodies other than those which 
the treaty has established to effect and supervise the exercise of such 
power each within the limits of its own»
29. The problem of guaranteeing 
an efficient Community decision-making process in the face of these legal 
and structural limitations has been mostly resolved by the creation of 
transnational administrative committees.  
The first committees to be established were the expert committees and 
the committees of the ECSC Council, which go back to 1952-1953. From 
the beginning, the High Authority officials and foreign ministers meeting 
in the ECSC Special Council sought the help of national administrations. 
In the EEC legal system, in addition to the expert committees (which are 
active mainly in the proposal phase) and the Council committees (which 
act in the legislative phase), the first comitology committees (which 
intervene in the implementing phase) emerged in the 1960s. Since 1962, 
in the face of a growing workload, the EEC Council of Ministers began to 
use the Treaties’ only express tool of flexibility in allocating the workload 
between Community institutions: handing executive competences over to 
the Commission
30. The treaty provision enabling this (Article 211, 
formerly Article 155) was supplemented by establishing committees, 
made up of national officials with the task of assisting the Commission. 
The balance that this struck seemed to be satisfactory, and led the Council 
to make regular use of the delegation option. Ever greater decision-
making powers were assigned to the Commission, leading this executive 
branch to grow, while the legislative branch contracted. In order to 
confront the growing workload produced by the expansion of Community 
competences, particularly noticeable since the 1970s, the Council 
delegated a considerable part of its work to the Commission and to the 
executive committees assisting it.  
Committees played a key role in this re-allocation of powers from the 
Council to the Commission, mainly for two reasons. The first is that their 
creation enabled a «re-nationalisation» of Community decision-making, 
by getting national administrations involved in the decisions delegated by 
the Council to the Commission. The second reason regards the executive 
                                                 
29 Case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1958] ECR 11.  
30 Article 211 (formerly Article 155) of the EC Treaty. Cahier européen n°03/2005  11 
 
and expert committees more specifically: such committees enabled 
Commission officials (who are, as already mentioned, quite limited in 
number) to benefit from the collaboration of thousands of national civil 
servants in confronting their growing workload. 
This institutional evolution stands in sharp contrast to a static notion 
of institutional balance: in substantive violation of the Meroni prohibition 
– never formally pronounced by the Court of Justice – a growing part of 
the legislative and executive workload assigned to the Council and 
Commission is carried out by committees of national civil servants. The 
balance of powers is altered, since substantive decision-making (and thus 
discretionary) powers are assigned to bodies to which, judging from the 
letter of the treaties, they do not belong
31.  
A reinterpretation of the principle of institutional balance in 
functional or dynamic terms would suggest a different conclusion. There 
is a twofold justification for the delegation of executive and legislative 
competences: efficiency, in so far as it promises a better division of labour 
among EU institutions and more efficient decision-making processes; 
representativeness, in so far as it enables governments to represent their 
interests at all steps of the decision-making process, even when, for 
practical reasons (lack of time and expertise) the ministers would be 
unable to do so. 
As far as they improve the decision-making capacity of the EU 
governing institutions, committees are therefore implicitly «covered» by 
Article 7 of the Treaty. By making use of executive and legislative 
committees, the Council and the Commission are each able to exercise 
«the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty»
32 and to assume the 
                                                 
31 Though the executive and legislative committees have gained a foothold in the 
Treaties, in Articles 202 and (though limited to COREPER) 207 (specific provisions 
expressly call for the establishment of special or senior Council committees) 
respectively, these provisions in no way authorize the delegation of decision-making 
powers to these auxiliary bodies. For this reason, a simple static interpretation of 
institutional balance – consistent with the leading jurisprudence of the Court of Justice – 
together with a recognition of the discretionary nature of the committee’s powers, would 
preclude the recognition of their legitimacy.  
32 Article 7 of the EC Treaty. This is the provision that the Court of Justice connects 
with the principle of institutional balance. Cahier européen n°03/2005  12 
 
consequent responsibility
33. As for the second function performed by 
committees – representativeness – it is the very foundation of institutional 
balance. This principle seeks to ensure respect for the balance of the 
interests considered important by the Treaty’s framers, with respect to the 
different sectors and decision-making phases. If the Treaty assigns 
legislative and executive powers to the Council in order to guarantee the 
representation of national governments’ interests, and if the only way to 
adequately represent these interests in all sectors (even the most 
technical) and phases (even the detailed analysis of legal texts) is by 
setting up committees, then the creation of transnational committees 
seems to satisfy the need to maintain this balance.  
 
 
4.2.  The Vertical Dimension: the Effectiveness EU Law 
 
A second argument for the compatibility of the EU transnational 
committees with the principle of institutional balance regards the 
committees’ (and not only the comitology committees) decisive role in 
implementing Community law.  
 
a)  The Vertical Meaning of Institutional Balance  
The idea that the principle of institutional balance has a vertical 
dimension as well as a horizontal one is controversial. Challenges to this 
argument appeal to a strict interpretation of Article 7 of the Treaty (which 
refers only to Community institutions)
34, as well as to objections of 
                                                 
33 Already from the Köster decision, the Court revealed its sensitivity to efficiency 
considerations, when it affirmed that «the management committee machinery [...] 
enables the Council to delegate to the Commission an implementing power of 
appreciable scope, subject to its power to take the decision itself if necessary» (Case 
25/70 Einfuhrstelle v. Köster [1971] ECR 1161, para. 9). 
34 G. Guillermin, Le principe de l’équilibre institutionnel dans la jurisprudence de 
la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes, in Journal du droit international, 
1992, p. 328, restricts the range of the principle’s application to the «institutional 
triangle» made up of the Council, Parliament and Commission. Analogously, B. de 
Witte, The Role of Institutional Principles in the Judicial Development of the European 
Union Legal Order, in F. Snyder (ed.), The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects 
of European Integration, op. cit., p. 91, considers the principle of institutional balance as 
a merely horizontal institutional principle. Cahier européen n°03/2005  13 
 
principle
35. But arguments in favour convincingly sustain that «the full 
complexity of the Community structure may only be understood if the 
institutional balance of powers is defined widely, not only encompassing 
the balance between the individual Community institutions, but also 
including the balance between the Community and the Member States. 
Such a functional understanding of the notion of the balance of powers 
thus further explains why it be necessary not only to give the Member 
States and their national institutions a voice in the legislative process, but 
also to allow them a degree of influence over the process of the 
implementation and application of Community law»
36.   
This position thus does not rest upon merely theoretical foundations. 
The idea of institutional balance is, first of all, incorporated into the 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Paragraph 2 of the 
Protocol declares: «The application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality shall respect the general provisions and the objectives of 
the Treaty, particularly as regards the maintaining in full of the acquis 
communautaire and the institutional balance». It seems intuitive that the 
connection between the preservation of institutional balance and the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
                                                 
35 See in particular, S. Prechal, Institutional Balance: A Fragile Principle with 
Uncertain Contents, op. cit., p. 284, which makes the following argument: «To consider 
institutional balance as a means of maintaining the integrity of the Member States’ 
powers seems to me to be rather contradictory with the concept of institutional balance 
as an inherent safeguard building upon the tradition of constitutional checks and 
balances. Instead of helping to avoid the concentration of powers, the introduction of the 
interests and concerns of the Member States into the notion of institutional balance is 
producing the opposite effect, in particular in strengthening the position of the Council, 
with as a possible result the further intergovernmentalization of the Community». This 
objection seems to be based on an incorrect perception of the consequences of the 
Member States’ participation in the Community decision-making process: their 
involvement takes place mainly through the transgovernmental committees, which do 
not function according to intergovernmental logic and procedures.  
36 E. Vos, The Rise of Committees, op. cit., p. 223. See also, M. Everson, 
Independent Agencies: Hierarchy beaters?, in European Law Journal, 1995, vol. 2, n. 1, 
pp. 196-198. Cahier européen n°03/2005  14 
 
understood in the Protocol as vertical institutional principles
37, makes 
sense only if institutional balance also comprehends the relationships 
between Community powers and Member States. 
Furthermore, a wide concept of institutional balance has been 
accepted by the Court of Justice. In delimiting its own competence, the 
Court explicitly affirmed that the institutional balance required by the 
Treaties establishes conditions, according to which the Member States 
participate in the work of Community institutions
38. 
Therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to maintain that the 
principle of institutional balance has a vertical dimension, comprehending 
the balance of powers between the Union and its Member States. 
 
b)  State Autonomy and the Supremacy of Community Law: the «Dual 
Loyalty» of the National Administrations 
In principle, the implementation of the EU law is part of Member 
States’ competence. Member States’ administrative autonomy has been 
recognised by the Court: «[a]ccording to the general principles on which 
the institutional system of the Community is based and which govern the 
relations between the Community and the Member States, it is for the 
Member States, by virtue of Article 5 [now 10] of the Treaty, to ensure 
that Community regulations […] are implemented within their territory. 
In so far as Community law, including its general principles, does not 
include common rules to this effect, the national authorities when 
implementing Community regulations act in accordance with the 
procedural and substantive rules of their own national law»
39. However 
                                                 
37 On the vertical nature of these principles, B. de Witte, The Role of Institutional 
Principles in the Judicial Development of the European Union Legal Order, op. cit., p. 
90. 
38 Case C-95/97 Région wallonne v. Commission [1997] ECR I-1787; Case C-
180/97 Region of Tuscany v. Commission [1997] ECR I-5245. 
39 Joined Cases 205-215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor Gmbh and others v. RFG [1983] 
ECR 2633, para. 17. On Member States’ institutional and administrative autonomy, see, 
respectively,  L.M. Díez-Picazo, What does it mean to be a State within the European 
Union?, in Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico, 2002, p. 655, and H. Oberdoff, Une 
Communauté administrative pour l’Europe ou l’administration en réseau, in Revue 
politiques et management public, 1997, vol. 15, n. 3, p. 8. On the limits imposed by the 
European Union on national administrative autonomy, S. Cassese, La signoria comunitaria 
sul diritto amministrativo, in Id., Lo spazio giuridico globale, op. cit., p. 93. Cahier européen n°03/2005  15 
 
autonomous in their administrative sphere, Article 10 of the Treaty 
requires Member States to loyally cooperate with Community institutions 
to ensure the implementation of Community law. It is precisely in 
applying this principle of loyal cooperation that the Court of Justice has 
developed its jurisprudence of the supremacy of Community law
40.  
The coexistence of the rule of national administrative autonomy on 
the one hand, and the doctrine of Community law supremacy on the other, 
gives rise to a crucial problem, the so-called dual loyalty of national civil 
servants: «On one hand, they are integrated in their respective 
institutional hierarchies. On the other hand, national agencies are 
responsible for the implementation of EU law and thus function as the 
substructure of the European institutions. That dédoublement fonctionnel 
may lead to conflicts if state officials receive diverging commands form 
the two orders»
41. In theory, the conflict is resolved by national officials’ 
duty to apply Community law and to disregard any potentially conflicting 
norms
42. Still, «to suggest that the doctrine of priority resolves the 
conflict is to presuppose what is often yet to ascertain, namely that EU 
law applies directly and has a defined content. Since authorities do not 
have the option to refer questions to the ECJ, legality of administrative 
conduct is at risk of becoming selective»; moreover, «priority does not 
help where there is nothing on the Union level which can compensate for 
the loss of the norm set aside for the sake of uniform application of EU 
law. This is usually the situation in administrative law»
43. Every time 
national bureaucrats apply Community law, they must analyse the 
compatibility of existing national administrative regulations with 
                                                 
40 The connection between Community law supremacy and the principle of loyal 
cooperation set forth in Article 10 of the Treaty is explained in Case C-213/89 Queen v. 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1990] ECR I-
2433, para. 19. On this subject, B. de Witte, The Role of Institutional Principles in the 
Judicial Development of the European Union Legal Order, op. cit., p. 88. 
41 S. Kadelbach, European Administrative Law and the Law of a Europeanized 
Administration, in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s 
Integrated Market, op. cit., p. 176. 
42 Case C-103/88 Fratelli Costanzo spa v. City of Milan [1989] ECR 1838, para. 30-
31. 
43 S. Kadelbach, European Administrative Law, op. cit., p. 177 s. Cahier européen n°03/2005  16 
 
European law
44. It might happen that an incompatible national rule 
creates a gap in which there is neither a national nor a Community 
administrative rule for implementing Community legislation.  
In other words, the administrative autonomy of the Member States 
produces a gap between legislation and administration, which the doctrine 
of Community law supremacy is not able to fill, and which also risks 
compromising the very effectiveness of Community law. 
 
c)  The «Europeanisation» of Community Law: a General Remedy?  
It has been argued that the best solution to this problem would be a 
«Europeanisation» of national administrative law
45. This could take place 
in two ways: «by principles» or «by norms». Europeanisation through 
principles occurs when national administrative law reflects the principles 
established in Community law and can therefore be applied on the basis 
of the criteria of effectiveness and equivalence
46. Europeanisation through 
norms happens when there are no alternatives to the application of 
Community norms, because they leave national authorities no discretion. 
Undoubtedly, this solution can be effective in some cases. 
Europeanisation through principles enables administrations to apply the 
existing national law when it is substantially equivalent to the Community 
law and is thus able to guarantee effectiveness. But, while the conditions 
of effectiveness and equivalence might be met by domestic law, this is 
                                                 
44 For a recent example of the problem of dual loyalty, see the Court of Justice’s 
recent decision in the CFI case (Case C-198/2001 Consorzio fiammiferi italiani [2003] 
not yet published).  
45 This is the argument of S. Kadelbach, European Administrative Law, op. cit., pp. 
178-180. 
46 Case 39/73, Rewe-Zentralfinanz c. Director der Landwurtschsftskammer Westfalen-
Lippe [1973] ECR 1039, para. 5; Case 45/76, Comet BV c. Productschap voor Siergewassen 
[1976] ECR 2043; Case C-231/96, Edis v. Minister of Finance [1998] ECR I-4951, para. 
34: in the absence of a Community implementing law, «it is for the domestic system of 
each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay 
down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which 
individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less 
favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and 
second, that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise 
of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness)». Cahier européen n°03/2005  17 
 
certainly not always the case
47. Europeanisation through norms can 
likewise only be exceptional, because it has the disadvantage of 
compromising the administrative autonomy of the States. It is no accident 
that it has been used in a very limited context
48.  
 
d)  The General Remedy: the «Nationalisation» of Community Law 
through Transnational Committees 
Before Community law «Europeanises» national administrative laws, 
national administrations «nationalise» Community law: this remedy to the 
gap between European legislation and national implementation seems to 
be the general one. Both primary norms (through expert committees and 
Council committees) and implementing acts (through comitology 
committees) are carefully elaborated and negotiated by Community 
institutions in consultation with national administrations.  
The need for this «nationalisation» of Community law is clear in the 
context of executive measures. The participation of the administrations in 
the downward phase of the decision-making process takes place in so far 
as States are directly responsible for carrying out the implementing acts 
set forth by the Commission. As has been remarked, «la Commission ne 
dispose pas d’une administration opérationnelle, d’une administration de 
terrain. Il lui faut s’en remettre aux administrations nationales. Mais la 
Commission n’a pas de prise directe sur celles-ci: les comités constituent 
l’articulation essentielle, l’intermédiaire obligé entre le niveau de 
l’exécution normative qui relève des autorités communautaires, et le 
niveau de l’exécution "administrative" qui continue à relever des 
administrations nationales. C’est parce qu’ils occupent cette place 
stratégique, que les comités ne peuvent être considérés comme des 
                                                 
47 See, on this issue, A. Tomkins, Of Institutions and Individuals: The Enforcement of 
EC Law, in P. Craig e R. Rawlings (eds.), Law and Administration in Europe. Essays in 
Honour of Carol Harlow, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 281-285. 
48 As recognized by S. Kadelbach himself (Id., European Administrative Law, op. 
cit., p. 179 s.), the Court deny Member States’ procedural autonomy almost exclusively 
in the area of State aids, for the reason that «where State aid is found to be incompatible 
with the common market, the role of the national authorities is […] merely to give effect 
to the Commission's decision. The authorities do not, therefore, have any discretion as 
regards revocation of a decision granting aid» (Case C-24/95, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v 
Alcan Deutschland GmbH [1997] ECR I-1591, para. 34). Cahier européen n°03/2005  18 
 
"bavures" du système communautaires, des scories qu’il faudrait éliminer 
à tout prix ou encore des séquelles d’une incorrigible souveraineté 
étatique, toujours prête à reprendre d’une main ce qu’elle a donné de 
l’autre»
49. 
Similar needs for cooperation also exist in relation to legislative acts. 
It often happens that a Community law is directly implemented by 
national administrations, without there being an executive measure from 
the Commission specifying implementation details and procedures. In 
these cases, there is the need to avoid a conflict between Community law 
and Member States’ norms (such as those expressing constitutional 
principles) and/or implementing procedures. The involvement of national 
administrations in the initiative and upward phase of the decision-making 
process enables them to raise these incompatibility concerns and thus to 
resolve from the outset problems that could become unsolvable later on in 
the implementation phase and consequently lead to non-compliance. For 
this reason, the presence of transgovernmental committees in the initiative 
and legislative phase significantly reduces the risk of non-compliance by 
building a «counterpunctual law»
50, a ius commune compatible with 
national iura particularia.  
The European committees are thus one of the main tools of 
integration and cohesion in the composite legal system of the European 
Union. Without them, Community law would not have such a high level 
                                                 
49 C. Blumann, Le pouvoir exécutif de la Commission et le problème de la 
comitologie, in Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario, 1993, p. 1059. In the 
same vein, J.-P. Jacqué, L’éternel retour: réflexion sur la comitologie, in Mélanges en 
hommage à Jean-Victor Louis, Vol. I, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 
2003, p. 221: «La comitologie a souvent été considérée comme une question technique. 
Mais, derrière l’apparente technicité des procédures se dissimule une question 
constitutionnelle importante, celle de la nature du “fédéralisme” que l’on souhaite 
construire. Les traités avaient organisé un fédéralisme d’exécution décentralisé. Or les 
querelles interinstitutionnelles ont masqué l’enjeu du problème. Souhaite-t-on réellement 
centraliser l’adoption des normes d’exécution? Il ne semble pas que la réponse soit 
positive». 
50 The expression is borrowed by M. Poiares Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: 
W h a t  i f  t h i s i s As  G o o d  A s  I t  G e t s? , in J.H.H. Weiler e M. Wind (eds.), European 
Constitutionalism beyond the State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 
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of implementation
51, or the national administrations would be forced to 
give up their organizational and procedural autonomy. If one considers 
how important it is for a composite legal system to achieve a satisfactory 
balance between the administrative autonomy of its Member States and 
the effectiveness of its ius commune, one can easily appreciate the 
essential role of the European transnational committees. 
 
 
5.  The Problem of Accountability 
 
Arguing that the EU committees are compatible with the institutional 
balance laid down in the Treaties and supporting a functional 
understanding of this balance does not mean, on the other hand, to deny 





5.1.  EU Committees between the International Transgovernmental 
Relations Model and the State Transmission-Belt Model 
 
The EU is a composite legal order halfway between an international 
organization and a state legal system. It might be useful for this reason to 
compare the accountability mechanisms of the EU committees with those 
of international transgovernmental bodies and national governmental 
administrations. 
The administrative committees of the European Union are subject to 
the same control mechanisms as are transgovernmental bodies operating 
in the international context. Each committee official answers to the 
director of her/his own administration, who in turn answers to the 
                                                 
51 See T.A. Börzel, Non-compliance in the European Union: pathology or statistical 
artefact?, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2001, vol. 8, n. 5, p. 803; J. Tallberg, Paths 
to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, in International 
Organization, 2002, vol. 56, n. 3, p. 632; M. Zürn and C. Joerges (eds.), Law and 
Governance in Postnational Europe: Compliance beyond the Nation-State, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
52 For a recent assessment of this problem, R. Dehousse, Comitology: Who Watches 
the Watchmen?, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2003, vol. 10, n. 5, p. 798. Cahier européen n°03/2005  20 
 
political leaders. There is (the possibility of) a constant exchange of 
information between committee officials and their home administrations. 
Most of the delegates come from the capital cities and report back to their 
directors about how they served their mandate. National civil servants 
fixed in Brussels are instead subject to a twofold subordination, which 
implies a twofold control: organizationally, they depend on the Permanent 
Representative of their Member State and thus answer to the permanent 
representative (or her/his substitute), who answers in turn to the 
minister;
53 functionally, they depend on the competent national 
administrative body, which sends them instructions to follow and receives 
timely reports of the meetings. The national administrations’ ordinary 
accountability mechanisms are thus at work here.  
It is argued on the other hand that this mechanism for controlling the 
transgovernmental phenomenon is slackening. In the early 1970s, the first 
transnational relations scholars pointed out the existence of a 
«transbureaucratic politics», conceived as decision-making flows taken 
out of the hands of national political leaders. They, therefore, emphasized 
the existence of this peculiar problem of accountability
54. Actually, the 
accountability problem raised by transnational phenomenon is real. The 
work of national officials sent to Brussels is carried out in what are 
largely opaque committees. The national director’s only means of control 
is usually to review the meeting report prepared by the national official or 
a co-delegate. The consensual logic behind these committees’ actions 
enables a would-be dissenting bureaucrat to justify his conformist choice, 
by invoking the need to avoid isolation. This effectively weakens the 
director’s ability to oversee the work of the official sent by the national 
administration to transnational committees. But similar dynamics 
protecting civil servants from political control can also be seen at the 
                                                 
53 J. Lewis, National Interests: COREPER, in J. Peterson and M. Shackleton (eds.), 
The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 294. 
54 K. Kaiser, Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics, in 
International Organization, 1971, XXV, p. 790; K. Kaiser, Transnational Relations as a 
Threat to the Democratic Process, in R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye (eds.), Transnational 
Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, 1972, p. 350. On the phenomenon of 
transgovernmental relations in general, R.O. Keohane e J.S. Nye, Transgovernmental 
relations and international organizations, in World Politics, 1974-75, p. 43. Cahier européen n°03/2005  21 
 
national level
55. We can thus question whether the problem of 
bureaucratic accountability assumes a special dimension at the 
supranational level. 
Moreover, in contrast with international transgovernmental bodies, 
European committees are also subject to genuinely supranational control 
mechanisms
56. All EU committees are subject to control by the institution 
politically responsible for their decisions. The Commission formally 
enacts the measures adopted by the comitology committees and has 
complete control over the content of their decisions, since no textual 
amendment may be proposed without the consent of its delegation. 
Moreover, the Commission controls the overall finances of the executive 
and expert committees in different ways (organizationally and financially, 
these committees depend on the Commission), answering to the European 
Parliament for their operational costs; on the basis of recent inter-
institutional agreements, moreover, it sends the Parliament a wide range 
of information, inducing the Commission offices to widen and intensify 
their monitoring of comitology. Similarly, the legislative committees are 
subject to the control of the Council, which provides them the necessary 
organizational and financial support. Control of the content of the 
decisions by the ministers themselves can be seen from time to time, but 
COREPER, through the Antici and Mertens groups, carries out a timely 
verification of the consensual decisions adopted by the working groups in 
relation to the national positions (so-called double check). Finally, there is 
an overall system of accountability deriving from the co-participation of a 
plurality of institutional actors in the decision-making process
57. These 
                                                 
55 On the domestic phenomena of bureaucratic politics, see the classic A. Downs, 
Inside Bureaucracy, Boston, Brown, 1967. 
56 However, one should not forget that the legitimation of «transgovernmental 
relations» is based on wider assumptions than mere domestic accountability: see, in 
particular, R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, The club model of multilateral cooperation and 
problems of democratic legitimacy, (2001), now in R.O. Keohane, Power Governance in 
a Partially Globalized World, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 219, especially p. 233; A.M. 
Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in M. Byers 
(ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and 
International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 177. 
57 See infra, § 5.3. Cahier européen n°03/2005  22 
 
control mechanisms bring the EU committees closer to the government 
bureaucracies of state legal systems.  
In sum, Community transnational administration, though giving rise 
to phenomena of «transbureaucratic politics» similar to those observed in 
international transnational relations, can be distinguished by its subjection 
to control not only by the national governments, but also by genuinely 
supranational accountability mechanisms. These control mechanisms, 
however, only partially compensate for the lack of direct political 
supervision and of ex ante criteria and directive principles that the 
committees must follow in carrying out their substantive decision-making 
activity. The gap between the transmission-belt model and the reality of 
European transnational administration is thus evident: the Community 
institutions assuming political responsibility for the committees’ de facto 
decisions – the Commission and the Council – only partially and 
indirectly guide and control the committees’ activities. 
 
 
5.2.  Transparency and Participation: the Real Problems? 
 
It is now necessary to ascertain whether the weakness of the 
transmission-belt model are counterbalanced by the existence of interest 
representation mechanisms. Considering that weakness, it is not 
surprising that the questions of the committees’ transparency and 
participation are hotly debated at the moment. 
The situation with respect to transparency has been noticeably 
improved in recent years. Right of access to committee documents (in 
particular, to the minutes of the meetings) has been recognized by recent 
norms and Court decisions, which have clarified that the same rules apply 
to the committees as to the Council and Commission
58. Furthermore, 
                                                 
58 The general rule is set forth in Regulation 2001/1049/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents (in OJ L 145, 31 May 2001, p. 43). The 
right of access to comitology committee documents is expressly set forth in Article 7 of 
Council Decision 1999/468/EC. Access to Council committee documents, insofar as 
they are Council documents, is ensured by general legal norms: see in particular Annex 
II («Specific Provisions Regarding Public Access to Council Documents ») to Council 
Decision of 22 July 2002 (OJ L 230 of 28 August 2002, p. 21). See Case T-188/97 Cahier européen n°03/2005  23 
 
information regarding the number of committees, their composition and 
their daily agenda can now be obtained with relative ease. The 
Commission published an annual report containing quantitative data 
regarding the system of executive committees
59. The Secretary General of 
the Council has a similar duty with respect to its committees, and many 
documents (for example, the daily agenda) are published on the Council’s 
internet site
60. 
Still, there remain some knots to untangle. A controversial point is 
whether committee meetings should be open to the public (currently they 
are not). On the one hand, a committee’s exposure to the scrutiny of 
public opinion risks compromising the efficacy of its decision-making 
process: subjected to public scrutiny, the delegates could harden their 
positions, undermining the committee’s ability to reach speedy 
compromises. On the other hand, open meetings would prevent the risk 
that the committees degenerate into elitist or neo-corporative fora
61 – 
especially the expert committees, where participants do not have official 
positions to defend and there is less formality and transparency
62.  
The committees’ internal rules do not provide for formal notice-and-
comment procedures. The consultation of social and economic interest 
groups is, therefore, occasional. Still, the committee system offers two 
important channels for introducing those interests into the Community 
decision-making process. First of all, a committee member is often given 
a mandate; in helping him to define it, governments and administrations 
solicit and filter the interests present in the national public spheres. 
Secondly, many interest committees help the Commission and are 
                                                                                                                        
Rothmans International v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2463 and Case C-211/00 Kuijer 
v. Council [2002] ECR II-485. 
59 The latest is the Report from the Commission on the working of committees in 
2002, 8 September 2003, COM (2003) 530 final. 
60 At the address: www.ue.eu.int. Cfr. Article 10 («Public Register of Council 
Documents») of Annex II to Council Decision of 22 July 2002 (OJ L 230 of 28 August 
2002, p. 21). 
61 Like those foreseen by J.H.H. Weiler, European democracy and its critics: polity 
and system, in Id., The Constitution of Europe: “Do New Clothes Have a New 
Emperor?” and Other Essays on European Integration, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, p. 270. 
62 In this sense, M. Rhinard, The Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union 
Committee System, in Governance, 2002, vol 15, n. 2, p. 204. Cahier européen n°03/2005  24 
 
themselves consulted in the proposal phase. Through bipartite and 
tripartite interest committees, European and national associations are 
involved in the formulation of Community policies. 
In short, the level of transparency and openness of the overall system 
of committees has improved in recent years, even if it is not yet 
satisfactory
63. Indeed, devices for guaranteeing the representation of 




5.3.  Accountability: Taking the Composite Nature of the 
Community Legal System Seriously 
 
The EU committees represent an essential element in the EU’s 
institutional balance. Still, their democratic legitimacy appears rather 
weak. The transmission-belt model is inadequate: the politically 
responsible European institutions do not have the necessary time and 
expertise to set down cogent mandates and to oversee their execution. The 
interest representation model is not completely realized either: in the 
transnational administration of the EU, the representation of non-
governmental (social and economic) interests is not guaranteed by 
procedures or formal consultation duties, as the Commission is not 
obliged to consult interest group committees
64, nor to follow their 
recommendations.  
However, in a composite system like the EU, the problem of 
accountability is less serious than in other legal systems. International 
systems depend on intergovernmental forms of cooperation and 
legitimation; here transgovernmental relations manifest their democratic 
limits, by taking the control of the ultra-state decision-making process 
away from multinational and supranational powers, such as the European 
Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice. The problem of 
accountability at the EU level also arises in a different way than in 
                                                 
63 For a comprehensive analysis, S. Smismans, Law, Legitimacy, and European 
Governance: Functional Participation in Social Regulation, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2004. 
64 With the exception stated in Article 138, para. 2 and 3, of the EC Treaty.  Cahier européen n°03/2005  25 
 
national legal systems. National administration is conceived as an 
apparatus serving the government, according to the transmission-belt 
model, or as an independent authority, whose legitimacy rests on such 
procedures as notice-and-comment.  
The question is whether, notwithstanding this differences, the 
democratic accountability achieved by the EU is comparable with that of 
the Member States. In order to answer the question, we must proceed 
from the observation that the European Union has not inspired by the 
principle of the separation of powers. The EU is rather organized 
according to the principle of institutional balance whereby a balanced 
representation of the different institutionalized interests in the decision-
making process is ensured
65. Both principles seek to avoid the dominance 
of one partial interest over the community. But they have different means 
for achieving this aim.  
When powers are divided, the need to establish checks and balances is 
clear: otherwise the separation of one power from the others would enable 
the single institution to exercise its power without control. This gives rise 
to often overlapping accountability mechanisms among the different 
powers of the State. In the contrasting case of shared powers, like in the 
EU, the system of checks and balances is, so to speak, in re ipsa: each 
institution involved in a particular decision is able to control the activity 
of the others. This occurs for at least two reasons. 
The first is that shared powers give rise to a (substantive) co-
decision
66, which itself is an instrument of accountability. Executive 
measures require agreement between the Commission and the national 
administrations represented in the executive committees. Likewise, 
legislative decisions are the fruit of compromises between the 
                                                 
65 See J.P. Jacqué, Le labirinthe décisionnel, in Pouvoirs, 1994, vol. 69, p. 23, and 
Id., Cours général de droit communautaire, op. cit., p. 289: «Le principe d’organisation 
de la Communauté n’a pas été celui de la séparation des pouvoirs, mas bien plutôt, à 
notre sens, celui de la représentation des intérêts. Chaque institution communautaire est 
porteuse d’un intérêt spécifique à la défense duquel elle œuvre dans le cadre du 
processus décisionnel communautaire».  
66 Formally, one speaks of co-decision only in reference to the legislative procedure 
set forth by Article 251 of the Treaty. Here I understand the word «co-decision» in a 
wider meaning, as including all the instances in which two or more (governing or 
auxiliary) bodies exercise de iure or de facto decision-making powers. Cahier européen n°03/2005  26 
 
Commission and the national administrations represented in the 
legislative committees (or, should the competent committee fail to reach 
an unanimous agreement, between the Commission and the national 
governments represented in the Council of Ministers). Moreover, in cases 
of co-decision, there is also the added deliberation and control of the 
Parliament. 
All of this means that every decision-making step (legislative act and 
relevant implementing act) is scrutinized by a considerable number of 
institutional actors: in the upward phase, by the Commission’s services 
which propose the law, by the expert, scientific and interest committees 
consulted, by the College of commissioners which approves it, by the 
competent Council committees, by the national administrations 
represented there, in consultation with their permanent representatives, 
and, when there is failure to reach an agreement, by COREPER, the 
Council of Ministers and, in cases of co-decision, by the Parliament, with 
its commissions and possibly a conciliation committee. In the downward 
phase: by the Commission’s services, which prepare Community 
measures with the assistance of expert committees (i.e. national civil 
servants, representatives of socio-economic interests and/or scientists), by 
the national administrations represented in the executive committee, by 
the college of Commissioners and, in the case of a negative opinion of the 
management or regulation committee, by the Council with its working 
groups, diplomats and ministers.  
The second reason for which shared powers offer a heightened 
guarantee of accountability is that the Community decision-making 
process is full of super-majorities
67 and, above all, it is governed by the 
rule of unanimous consensus. This rule is constantly applied in the 
Council legislative committees, and also prevails in the deliberative 
practice of bodies like executive committees, the College of 
Commissioners and the Council of Ministers. Where disagreement 
                                                 
67 This is pointed out by A. Moravcsik, In Defence of the «Democratic Deficit»: 
Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 
2002, vol. 40, n. 4, p. 609, who underscores in particular that: «Even “everyday” EU 
directives must be promulgated under rules that require the concurrent support of 
between 74 and 100 per cent of the weighted votes of territorial representatives in the 
Council of Ministers – a level of support higher than required for legislation in any 
existing national polity or, indeed, to amend nearly any constitution in the world». Cahier européen n°03/2005  27 
 
prevents this rule from working, these bodies proceed to the vote. The 
vote is always adopted by a super-majority: it is a qualified majority, for 
example in the executive committees and in the Council (when it is not 
actually unanimous)
68; the European Parliament, in order to reject the 
common position of the Council, must reach an absolute majority
69.  
Despite all this, it might happen that the national officials working in 
the transnational committees escape the substantial oversight of the other 
actors involved in the decision-making process, because, for example, 
they are the only ones with the expertise necessary to analyse and amend 
specific legal texts. Still, even in such case, one should acknowledge that 
this is not very different from what happens in national legal systems
70.  
In sum, the involvement of a plurality of institutions representing 
diverse interests in the decision-making process, the existence of 
unanimous agreements and the requirement of particularly heightened 
majorities all make it unlikely that partial, narrow interests (of a single 
nation-people, government or administration) will prevail. We can thus 
conclude that, through the lens of accountability, the system of 
institutional balance is – in contrast to what many members of the 
European Parliament and others sustain – the functional equivalent of the 
principle of the separation of powers: both prevent the tyranny of partial 
interests over the whole. 
 
 
6. Legitimacy  through  Law 
 
                                                 
68 The absolute (unqualified) majority rule, though set forth in general terms by 
Article 205(1) of the Treaty, has not been concretely applied.  
69 Articles 251( 3) and 252(c) of the Treaty. 
70 A. Moravcsik, In Defence of the «Democratic Deficit»: Reassessing Legitimacy in 
the European Union, op. cit., p. 613: «within the multi-level governance system 
prevailing in Europe, EU officials (or insulated national representatives) enjoy the 
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States of the EU, insulate themselves from direct political contestation. The apparently 
“undemocratic” nature of the EU as a whole is largely a function of this selection 
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Finally, I turn to what is perhaps the main lacuna in this system: the 
law. It is often ignored that the law constitutes a very important source of 
legitimacy for public powers
71. Yet, transnational committees almost 
completely lack a legal foundation.  
First of all, the internal procedures of the Council committees are not 
formalized, but rather shaped along the lines of the Council’s rules of 
procedure. Even in the case of the executive committees, that do have 
internal regulations, the most important rules can be apprehended only by 
looking at actual practice. Finally, with regard to the expert committees, it 
has been appropriately affirmed that «[t]he only general rule is that there 
is no general rule»
72. 
Rules have been set forth which aim to rationalize the committee 
system in certain sectors
73. But there is still a lack of general rules and, in 
particular, of cross-sectoral rules, for coordinating the activities of the 
various committees operating in the same decision-making phase. In this 
respect, the Commission and Council secretariats’ activities can only fill 
the gap in part. For example, in the case of Council working groups, 
cloisonnement is the rule: as a consequence of the fragmentation 
produced by the multiplication of Council formations, if the national 
delegates reach a compromise in committee on a proposal having cross-
sectoral importance, no rule requires that they give the other interested 
committees an opportunity to analyse the draft decision. The rotating 
presidency can freely decide to accelerate the procedures for the formal 
ratification of the Council’s decisions, which effectively prevents an 
examination by other competent committees, without encountering any 
resistance from explicit procedural norms. More generally, the absence of 
legal norms precludes the Community Courts from exercising judicial 
                                                 
71 S. Cassese, Is there really a “democratic deficit”?, in Europeos, Institutional 
reforms in the European Union, Rome, Failli, 2002, p. 21. 
72 G. Ciavarini Azzi, Comitology and the European Commission, in C. Joerges and 
E. Vos (eds.), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, op. cit., p. 52. 
73 One particularly significant attempt at defining and rationalising the decision-
making role of the different categories of committees is the so-called Lamfalussy 
approach. It has been first established in the sector of financial securities (Commission 
Decisions 2001/527/EC and 2001/528/EC of 6 June 2001), and then extended to banking 
and insurance (Commission Decisions 2004/5-10/EC of 5 November 2003). Cahier européen n°03/2005  29 
 
review over the committees’ activities, and this takes away a basic 
mechanism of accountability.  
This lacuna results, probably, from the will of Community institutions 
to avoid subjecting themselves to norms that might limit their discretion, 
or in the best of cases, that might limit their ability to experiment with 
more effective practices. It also results from the fact that the Court of 
Justice has declined to announce a single jurisprudential principle to fill 
the gap in the formal rules, except for the principles of the right of access 
to administrative documents
74 and some very specific procedural 
principles
75. European judges have adopted a pernicious stance of self-
restraint: «the committees do not have formal powers» – hey observe – 
from which a faulty logic concludes that «the committees are irrelevant to 
the institutional balance». The failure to overcome this view, which goes 
back more than three decades, has led to the exclusion of the committees 




7. Conclusions   
 
Though lacking a formally recognized constitutional status, the EU 
committees are an essential element of the «material» constitution of 
Europe.  
The committees appear as a constitutive element of institutional 
equilibrium, at least if this is understood in a functional sense. The 
efficiency of the Community decision-making process and the effective 
performance of the tasks assigned by the Treaties to the Council and the 
Commission depend on this multivalent transnational administration. 
European committees can also be credited with reconciling the Member 
States’ administrative autonomy with the effectiveness of «nationalised» 
                                                 
74 Case T-188/97 Rothmans International v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2463. 
75 For example, Case C-263/95 Germany v. Commission [1998] ECR I-441, 
affirming that the committee’s failure to send the draft document to members of a 
comitology committee in the official language of their Member State within the time-
limit and according to the committee’s rules of procedure constituted an infringement of 
essential procedural requirements, with the result that the contested Commission 
decision was void (para. 32). Cahier européen n°03/2005  30 
 
Community law, thus reducing the risk of Community law 
incompatibility with national administrative systems. 
The accountability problem exists, but some of the prominent 
criticisms rest on the faulty assumption that the organizing principle of 
the European Union is the separation of powers. This is not the case. The 
European system of power sharing is functionally equivalent to those 
providing for mechanisms of checks and balances and separation of 
powers. Furthermore, it gives rise to supranational mechanisms of 
oversight, in addition to the national ones. The European transnational 
administration is thus subjected to more intense forms of accountability 
than are transnational bodies in the international context.  
Still, there are two main problems: transparency (though there have 
been meaningful developments in recent years) and the feeble legal 
legitimacy of the committees. The second is particularly relevant: the lack 
of formalized norms and jurisprudential principles makes the committees’ 
decision-making process unintelligible and inconsistent. It is a serious 
problem, which probably calls for the full recognition of the 
constitutional significance of the committees of the European Union.  
The academic debate is dominated by two opposite perspectives – 
«deliberative supranationalism» and «infra-nationalism» – neither of 
which pays much attention to the latter problem. Meanwhile, European 
committees – which constitute a relatively immature transnational 
administration that is vital to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of 
EU decision making – remain awaiting for the law to strengthen their 
legitimacy.  
 